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PERAK DISTURBANCES 1871-75: BRITISH COLONIALISM, THE 
CHINESE SECRET SOCIETIES AND THE MALAY RULERS1
This article is a re-interpretation of the history of ‘power struggles’, 
‘civil wars’ and ‘anarchy’ which were asserted to have happened in 
Perak, one of the Malay states in the Malay Peninsula during the period 
of 1871-75. Up until now, historians tend to suggest that the ‘Malay 
feudalism’, i.e. the political disputes and the power struggle among the 
Malay rulers; were the main factors that prompted the Perak 1871-75 
mayhem. This writing, however, finds that allegations of ‘civil wars’ 
and ‘anarchy’; blamed for their so-called roles that pushed Perak to 
the brink of collapse and eventually led to British intervention, has 
not been credibly supported. By utilizing authoritative primary and 
secondary sources, the author argued that these are merely imaginary 
excuses invented by the British colonial officials to paint the negative 
perception that the disturbances happened at large in Perak and that 
the indigenous rule was deteriorating in shape. These excuses were 
made to simplify justifications by the British in its quest to intervene 
into the Malay states affairs in the late period of the 19th century. 
Keywords: Malay states, Perak, Raja Abdullah, Ngah Ibrahim, British
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Introduction
Historians in general have conceded that the scarcity of sources hinders 
comprehensive study on history of the Malay states in the 19th century. Much 
research on the subject therefore relies on past official records produced by 
the British colonial administrators as primary references. However, failure to 
balance the colonial historical perspectives gives rise to never-ending confusion 
that hampers thorough understanding of the actual historical developments 
taking place in Perak throughout the 19th century. 
MacIntyre (1967:71) explains that the colonial reports emphasize 
the inordinate influence of colonial ideologies and the element of ‘racial 
superiority’ that as a whole represents how the European generally perceived 
the indigenous world. The non-European political regions, including Malay 
Peninsula, were invariably viewed as ‘uncivilised’ and ‘barbarous’. The typical 
attitudes of the British towards the Malays can be deduced from a number of 
colonial records, for instance, by the words of Thomas Braddel, “The innate 
superiority of the ordinary Englishmen, in his sense of honour and justice, 
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is sufficient to dominate the inferior character of the Malays...” or Clifford 
(1989:71), “I, the European, the white man, belonging to one of the most 
civilised races in the Old World; the Malays, civilised too, but after the fashion 
of unchanging Asia, which differs so widely from the restless progressive 
civilisation of the West.” 
There had also been views that envisaged the benefits and prosperity 
these ‘half civilised’ and ‘half wild’ Malays could enjoy if they were to be 
governed by the European powers. According to the British Governor of the 
Straits Settlements, Harry Ord, “...the subjection of these native States of 
the Peninsular to Powers greater and more civilised than themselves is an 
advantage to themselves and to all who have relations with them” (CO273/18 
Ord to Buckhingham 8 April 1873). He therefore emphasised the need for the 
inevitable intervention: “I feel that it would be greatly to the advantage of the 
Settlement if our influence could be thus extended over the Peninsula and I 
shall not fail to avail myself of any opening that may present itself for doing 
so” (CO273/18 Ord to Buckhingham 8 April 1873).  
Sullivan (1982:xvi) explains that the excessive influence of the 
colonial ideologies in the interpretation of the Malay states history in 19th 
century brought about two main after-effects. First, there were continued 
myths about the decline of the Malay states and the growing anarchy before the 
British came to the rescue. Kimberley, for example, emphasises the British role 
in Perak and other Malay states in the 19th century as “...to rescue, if possible, 
these fertile and productive countries from the ruin which must befall them, if 
the present disorders continued unchecked” (CO273/75 Kimberley to Clark 
20 September 1873).  Since the indigenous political system was functioning 
distinctively disparate to the perpetually glorified, the ‘ideal-typical’ European 
monarchy, it was viewed as the worst kind of monarchy for an ‘Asiatic’ society. 
Violence, disunity among the rulers and the seemingly unchallenged power 
of the local aristocrats were attributed to the incompetence of the indigenous 
ruling. These circumstances led to, according to Swettenham, “The sultan of 
Perak invited the British to teach him how to rule this unruly country...’, but 
then added, ‘...the circumstances alone made that interference the duty of the 
paramount power” (quoted in Sullivan 1982:xvi).
Second, the Malay Archipelago was seen as an object within 
the discourse of Orientalism that dictated how the European assessed the 
populating inhabitants. This is illustrated through the inclined portrayal by the 
European writers of the typical ‘Asiatic’ characters of the Malay—decadency, 
ignorance and the mischief under the indigenous autocratic rulers—assumed 
only to be happening outside of Europe.2At the same time, the introduction 
of the European-style ruling system was drummed up as the most practical 
solution to all the misery of the ‘Asiatic’ world. 
In continuance, the myths extended to the indigenous historiography 
shape, which is said to be based on dichotomy before and after the colonial 
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era. Before the British arrival, the Malay states were supposed to be in decline 
and ‘anarchy’ (C. 1111 Anson to Kimberley, 19 October 1871:141). The whole 
of the Malay Peninsula, according to Ord, was in the hands of “...the lawless 
and the turbulent...” (C.1111 Ord to Kimberley, 10 July 1873: 30). while 
Swettenham (1983:178) alleged, “In each State the ruler, whether he was 
sultan, raja, or chief of lower rank, was supreme and absolute. His word was 
law, and oppression and cruelty were the result.”
The colonial era, on the other hand, was described as the beginning 
of the age of enlightenment. Clifford describes the British governance in the 
Malay states, which was said to have shattered the authoritarian rule and the 
tyranny, as an era that “...has brought peace, happiness, and prosperity to those 
to whom these things were formerly strangers; and has given to the Malays 
a new life – a life which for the first time in their history is a thing worth the 
living” (quoted in Kratoska 1983:248). The above presumption continues to 
be cultivated by the historians of subsequent generations.  Mills (1925:170-
173), for instance, described that the Malay states in the 19th century were 
committing political hara kiri among themselves.  Winstedt and Wilkinson 
(1934:2), on the other hand, asserted that “...the most convinced supporter of 
the rights and customs of small people must admire the Pax Britannica in 
Perak and bless the work of British protection in bringing out of centuries of 
great tribulation this rich and beautiful country and her ancient line.”  In 1991, 
a local historian, Cheah Boon Kheng (1991:16-17) elucidated that ‘Malay 
feudalism’ has brought about severe disunity among the Malays since the 
Malacca Malay Sultanate up until the 19th century. 
  Feudalism is the only element that allowed us to understand the reason 
the Malay governments in the Malay Peninsula were in constant 
chaos and rapidly declining during the 19th century, which eventually 
saw them falling into the hands of British, one after another...the 
discordance among the peninsular Malay states has been self-existence 
due to the feudalistic nature of the political and social system. If we 
focus our attention to the development of each of the Malay state since 
the Melaka Sultanate until the 19th century, the truth of this statement 
becomes more prevalent. For example, when the powerful Malacca 
government fell in 1511 and was replaced with the emerging Johor, 
the fights and disunity continued to haunt...Throughout the whole of 
the 19th century, no Malay state in the peninsular was spared from 
splits and power struggles: Kedah/Perlis 1821-1848, Terengganu 
1831-1839, Kelantan 1838-1839, Johor 1840-1855, Pahang 1857-
1863, Selangor 1867-1874, Negeri Sembilan 1869-1889 and Perak 
1871-1877.3   
The Perak Power Struggles in Malaysian Historiography
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Perak Disturbances 1871-75
The ‘power struggles’ and the ‘civil wars’ that were claimed to have happened 
in Perak in 1871-75 were frequently referred to illustrate the decline of the 
Malay States in the 19th century. According to the British colonial version, 
the Perak crisis began in 1870s soon after the demise of Sultan Ali (1865-
71). The late sultan left behind a few potential successors, all vying to ascend 
the throne. This sparked an ugly struggle for the Perak throne involving three 
possible candidates, namely Raja Abdullah (Raja Muda), Raja Ismail (Raja 
Bendahara) and Raja Yusof (Raja Di Hilir). 
The colonial version has it that Raja Muda Abdullah was the rightful 
successor to the throne. Clarke described Raja Abdullah as “...a man of 
considerable intelligence, who was supported by all chiefs present [in Pangkor] 
except the Mantari” (C.1111 Clarke to Kimberley, 26 January 1874:71). 
However, Raja Abdullah was dismissed after failing to turn up for Sultan Ali’s 
funeral and his installation ceremony as the new sultan. Instead, Raja Ismail—
an elderly man from Siak and not a direct descendant of the Perak royals—was 
appointed to succeed Sultan Ali. This decision created resentment among those 
who were opposed to the new ruler, and thus conflicts ensued.
The British colonial officials viewed Raja Ismail’s appointment 
as conflicting with the customary practice of the Perak Malay politics, and 
concluded this as an attempt to grab power through illegitimate means. Many 
of them, from W. H Read to R. O. Winstedt, believed that Raja Abdullah 
should have been the sultan but was denied by Raja Ismail and his followers. 
According to Read (1901:24), “The legitimate heir, Abdullah, was, by an 
intrigue, passed over, and Rajah Bandaharah Ishmael was appointed Sultan; 
but, the other chief having his partisans, civil war broke out in the country.” 
To Winstedt (1935:226): “He [Raja Abdullah] was the rightful heir and was 
intelligent and Europeanized and to disallow his claim because he had failed 
to attend a funeral seemed to Victorian rationalists frivolous.” Another British 
Governor of the Straits Settlements, W. R. Jervois blamed Raja Ismail’s actions 
that triggered a state of disorder in Perak, reiterating “...the anarchy of the 
country caused by Ismail’s claims” (C.1512 Jervois to Carnovan, 10 February 
1876:8).
There were also assertions that a number of Perak chiefs had exploited 
the situation for their own gains. For instance, the Mentari of Larut Ngah 
Ibrahim was divulged as ‘the main figure’ that played a key role in getting Raja 
Ismail into power. His purpose of influencing the appointment of an elderly and 
someone who was ‘unrelated’ to the royals was to ensure that he could align 
himself as the next successor.  The allegation that pointed Menteri Larut Ngah 
Ibrahim as the mastermind behind Raja Ismail’s attempt for state power was 
actually made firstly by a British officer, C. J. Irving (See SSR (G7) Irving’s 
memorandum, 30 April 1872).   
The splitting up became more alarming as each side was said to be 
engaging help from the Chinese triads (namely the Hai San and the Ghee Hin) 
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in an attempt to usurp to power. Further impasse brought about total chaos and 
anarchy, which saw the Perak government rapidly deteriorating; the entire state 
was in absolute disorder, civil wars broke out, pirates were rampaging and 
people were killed to the extent that there was no longer peace and safety in the 
whole state (C.1111 Campbell to Birch, July 1874:10).  Perak rulers were also 
said to be too weak to exert control on the chaos, which began to cause danger 
to British interests in Penang (CO 273/58 Report of A. N. Birch, 1 Mac 1872). 
These are the state of circumstances in Perak in the early 1870s that drove the 
then ‘Perak Sultan’ to write a letter to the British, appealing for intervention to 
save Perak and to assist him to govern the country. 
Beginning of a Crisis: Sultan Ali’s Demise and the Enthronement of Raja 
Ismail
All the descriptions put forward in the colonial officials’ reports above are 
actually confusing. These descriptions tend to picture only the negative aspects 
on the indigenous discordance and put blame on the Perak Malay rulers as 
being power hungry. The actual events were never explained objectively 
and comprehensively, but rather interpreted from the perspective of British 
colonialism in favour of their interest. This created further confusion towards 
identifying the real cause to the political instability in Perak. This state of 
confusion can be articulated in further details when the actual developments 
taking place in Perak in the early 1870s are described in the subsequent 
sections. 
The Perak crisis were said to begin when Sultan Ali, the ruling sultan, 
passed away in Sayong in May 1871. The Perak Malay customary tradition 
spelled out that Raja Bendahara, whose roles were to be an acting ruler and 
a custodian of the royal regalia, would be responsible to extend invitation 
to Raja Muda of Perak for appointment as the successor within seven days 
period. However, the legitimate successor, Raja Abdullah never responded to 
the invitation for both Sultan Ali’s funeral and his appointment as a new sultan. 
No solid reason was made available for Raja Abdullah’s action, although 
historians tend to explain that Raja Abdullah feared the threat of Raja Yusof, 
who was also the legitimate candidate for the throne.  
Nevertheless, there have been other reasons that triggered the above 
situation. First, it was understood that Raja Abdullah and the late Sultan Ali had 
a history being in a long personal feud.4Previous royal altercations indicate that 
it is common for disputing sides to boycott attending the ailing sultan and the 
funeral without jeopardising the appointment process of the successor (Raja 
Muda). Second, Raja Abdullah was suffering from loss of credibility after his 
wife, Raja Tipah eluded with a Selangor prince, Raja Daud. Raja Abdullah’s 
failure to take stern action and re-possess his wife was an embarrassment to 
the whole Perak chiefs and this adversely affected his reputation as a legitimate 
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state ruler. Most likely, Raja Abdullah’s hesitation to attend his appointment 
ceremony was due to humiliation. Moreover, Raja Tipah’s brother had sent a 
warning to kill him if he dared stepping his foot in Sayong (Burns 1976:12).
Notwithstanding, the Orang Besar-Besar (Perak Chiefs) were still 
hoping to appoint Raja Abdullah as the new sultan as opposed to the other two 
candidates, Raja Yusof and Raja Ismail. Raja Yusof was not favoured due to 
his known characters as a ruthless and vengeful person as was evident after 
the coup of his father’s throne, Sultan Abdullah (1851-57) by Raja Ali (later 
Sultan Ali). Raja Ismail, on the other hand, was not preferred by the Orang 
Besar-Besar as a suitable candidate as he did not come from the Perak’s royal 
family descendant. The Orang Besar-Besar’ refusal to appoint Raja Ismail 
was acknowledged by, for example, Khoo Kay Kim who describes that the 
concerted decision of the chiefs when considering the appointment of a Sultan 
before 1874 was not to put forward Raja Ismail, even for the Raja Muda (Khoo 
Kay Kim 1975:135). Apart from coming outside of the royal ranks, he was not 
preferred due to his previous collaboration with Panglima Perang Semaun in a 
conflict that ended with the murder of Dato’ Shahbandar.
Perhaps these are also the reasons Raja Ismail, despite being loyal and 
a close ally of Sultan Ali, was not appointed the Raja Muda when the latter was 
in power. Instead, Sultan Ali made Raja Abdullah as the Raja Muda, bypassing 
both Raja Ismail and Raja Yusof in the process. This move inferred that Sultan 
Ali was endorsing Raja Abdullah as the sultan in-waiting (Khoo Kay Kim 
1975:135). One month went past after Sultan Ali’s death and Raja Abdullah 
still had not shown any sign of securing his title. Orang Besar-Besar began to 
lose patience. They started planning to install another candidate, Raja Usman 
(Sultan Ali’s son) as the new ruler, but the offer was turned down. Raja Usman 
was never interested to helm the state and suggested Raja Ismail instead.
Lack of other credible candidates left the Perak chiefs with little 
choice, and soon all collectively agreed to accept Raja Ismail as the new 
sultan.5 Raja Ismail himself was at first declined the offer, but later changed 
his mind after much persuasion. He ascended the throne with the official title 
of Paduka Seri Sultan Mu’abidin Shah. The whole process was so smooth; no 
resistance was made and no side had come public to renounce Raja Ismail’s 
installation as the new sultan. In fact, days after Raja Ismail’s selection, 
Dato’ Laksamana, a close ally of Raja Abdullah and Raja Ismail’s foe, was 
said to publicly acknowledge the appointment and ‘...would carry out all the 
obligations as instructed by the new Sultan, including the Shahbandar too.’6
Therefore, narratives that implied that the appointment instantaneously 
led to ‘civil war’ within the Perak Malays can be argued as rather baseless. Raja 
Ismail’s ruling status was indeed recognised by the all parties, including the 
British,7Raja Yusoff and Raja Abdullah himself (Wilkonson 1923:116; Wyenne 
1941:283). The issue of scrutinising the most qualified candidate for the new 
Perak sultan was finally resolved through collective agreement between the 
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Orang Besar-Besar, and the eventual appointment was well acknowledged by 
all parties. At this point Wilkinson wrote:
 There was no question of any violent usurpation of the throne by 
[Raja] Ismail. He was not the rightful heir, it is true, nor was he even 
a prince of Perak in the direct male line; still he had done his duty 
by the heir and had been put on the throne with the full consent of 
chiefs and people. He was the de facto ruler and [Raja] Abdullah 
was only a claimant at the time when Sir Harry Ord left the Straits 
and was succeeded by Sir Andrew Clarke (Wyenne 1941:283).
Early Reactions Made by Raja Muda Abdullah
Soon after Raja Ismail’s appointment, Raja Abdullah did not show any 
imminent sign of reacting towards challenging the former’s legitimacy as 
the new sultan, despite quietly ‘discontented’ for being dismissed. He was 
believed to have kept quite and continue his normal life in Purbayan, (Hilir 
Perak) and never made any attempt to confront Raja Ismail openly and claim 
his own right.8
Raja Abdullah realised that he did not have any more legitimacy to the 
throne, and now was not in a position to change things. His political influence 
was limited and that a big proportion of those loyal to him were of weaker 
gender. He knew that he was in a rather powerless position to lead any sort 
of upheaval. As for the Orang Besar-Besar, who initially attempted to make 
Raja Abdullah sultan, the appointment of Raja Ismail as the new legitimate 
ruler must now be honoured and protected. The group even criticised Raja 
Abdullah’s attitude, which had been an embarrassment to the royal customs. 
Disappointment led the Orang Besar-Besar to express that Raja Abdullah was 
not qualified to ascend the throne, “...all greatly blamed Rajah Muda saying 
that he was not fit to rule for there could not be shown one single instance of 
his having benefitted his Country” (Khoo Kay Kim 1975:161-162). 
For a year, Raja Abdullah did not show his commitment to claim 
back his position as the sultan. But things gradually changed after he was 
hit with a serious financial adversity, mainly driven by his own extravagant 
style of living.9 It was during this time, some ‘hidden hands’ appeared to 
offer financial lifeline to him for their own agenda. Perak was a wealthy state 
and rich in natural resources; by exploiting the state’s political fragility, this 
unscrupulous third party could make maximum gains through these resources. 
Raja Abdullah’s ears were drummed with the idea of openly challenging the 
legitimacy of Raja Ismail. He was promised an undivided, powerful backing 
that included financial assistance and political interference. 
Backed by this support, he went ahead to challenge Raja Ismail’s 
position and made public his claim by writing to the British, alleging that: (i) 
Raja Ismail’s installation as sultan was contradicting to Perak customary royal 
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tradition; (ii) invitation for his royal appointment was not done according to the 
way a next-in-line sultan should receive; (iii) Raja Ismail had been deceptive 
and forceful in getting himself into power; (iv) Raja Ismail was supposed 
to be the acting sultan for a certain time until his (Raja Abdullah) official 
appointment; (v) and he did not make any previous attempt to challenge Raja 
Ismail’s status quo to avoid any chaos and disunity, which would adversely 
affect the British citizen and its trade interest in Perak (Buyong Adil 1971:62-
65). 
Raja Abdullah’s Financial Problems and the Perak Sultanate Rights 
The role of these ‘hidden hands’ behind the history of Perak’s conflict in 1870s 
was important but nevertheless received lack of attention in historical writings. 
Local historians’ writings barely touch on the subject of these ‘hidden hands’. 
Their background and roles in Perak crisis were almost never been discussed. 
Arguably, without their intervention, conflicts and power struggle in Perak 
might not have happened.  
These ‘hidden hands’ refer to the European-Chinese capitalist and 
the leaders of the Chinese triads in the Straits Settlements, and were closely 
linked to highly influential individuals such as Edward Bacon, W. H. Read and 
Tan Kim Ching.10 They are some of the many individuals who had interest 
in the capitalist activities of the British big companies in the Malay states, 
especially in Perak. They played a big role in triggering political conflict in 
Perak and were main players in the plot of making Raja Abdullah the new 
sultan. Furthermore, they had been actively engaging in campaigns to discredit 
the local political situation in an effort to urge the British to interfere. This 
coup d’etat was smartly engineered by tactfully persuading Raja Abdullah 
and offering conditional support. Raja Abdullah’s weakness and vulnerability 
made him an easy prey. 
Raja Abdullah was seen as a puppet in a plot to monopolize Perak’s 
economy and wealth. Through the guides of the parties-with-interest, Raja 
Abdullah made new claims, one after another. Envisaging himself as the new 
sultan, he began imagining taking the wealthy Larut back from Ngah Ibrahim 
and handing it over to a business group that would be willing to pay a high 
price. At the same time, he continued to lobby to the British to recognize him 
as the rightful sultan, despite knowing that this would antagonise the Perak 
chiefs (SSR (G7) Irving’s memorandum, 30 April, 5 Jun and 8 August 1872).
In an attempt to weaken Ngah Ibrahim’s position in Larut, Raja 
Abdullah began to collaborate with the Ghee Hin triad, which had previously 
defeated the Hai San group (backed by Ngah Ibrahim) in the Second Larut 
War. In January 1873, Raja Abdullah, together with Dato’ Laksamana, Dato’ 
Shahbandar and Raja Idris made a trip to Penang to make a pact with a Ghee 
Hin leader, Ho Gui Siu. An agreement was signed on 28 February 1873, which, 
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among others, gave acknowledgment for the triad to continue its involvement 
in the Larut War (Plunket 1876:2). In addition, if Larut could be successfully 
seized from Ngah Ibrahim, the Ghee Hin would be given a concessions and 
monopoly of the tin mines in Larut. In addition, Raja Abdullah committed to 
bear half of the expenses that the Ghee Hin spent during the armed conflicts 
with Ngah Ibrahim-backed Hai San group. In another meeting also in Penang, 
he even tried to sell the Kerian-Larut concession to Bacon. However, the 
British foiled the attempt under Ord’s instruction. Ord, at that time, was in 
fully support of Ngah Ibrahim’s position (Plunket 1876:2; Wynne 1941:270).
In truth, all attempts made by Raja Abdullah before 1871 to take over 
Larut from Ngah Ibrahim were never successful. He failed to get the backing 
of the Perak chiefs, especially those in Hulu Perak. His effort to get support 
from the British was also in vain despite numerous appeals. Without these 
supports, he was helpless and his ambition to seize power seemed coming to 
nought. However, a renewed confidence blossomed when he was introduced to 
a Singapore-based merchant, Tan Kim Ching. Also a member of the Ghee Hin, 
Tan had the motive to secure Larut’s wealth for himself and was willing even 
to recognize Raja Abdullah as the new Perak sultan. 
Tan sought help from his European business partners who had strong 
influence in the British administration in the Colonial Office and Straits 
Settlements such as Thomas Scott and Read. Promised by Raja Abdullah a 
lucrative 10-year concession of Larut, a plot to make Raja Abdullah the new 
sultan was charted. Read and Tan were two individuals responsible to bring 
Raja Abdullah’s claim to Ord’s attention, and later to Clarke, Ord’s successor. 
The role played by the two and another British officer, J. G. Davidson was of 
particular importance. They were believed to have drafted a letter dated 30 
December 1873 using Raja Abdullah’s name, signature and official seal (C. 
1111 Sultan Abdullah to the Governor of the Straits, 30 December 1873:85), 
requesting the Governor Clarke to act as ‘umpire’ in the ‘power struggle’ in 
Perak, accord British protection and suggested that British rendered personnel 
assistance in Perak’s governance.11 
Through the plot between the European-Chinese capitalists, the 
leaders of the Chinese Secret Societies in Penang and Singapore, who took 
advantage of Raja Abdullah’s financial fragility, and their own conspiracy with 
those in the Colonial Office, as well as the urge to interfere, Clarke had an 
inevitable decision to make. He decided that it was time for the British to 
intervene. Raja Abdullah was declared the official Sultan of Perak through the 
Pangkor Treaty signed in 1874. The treaty was seen as the first step towards a 
direct British intervention in Perak. 
The Chinese Secret Societies, the Larut Wars and ‘Power Struggle’ in 
Perak
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It is essential to reiterate that there had never been a genuine ‘civil war’ or 
‘anarchy’ among the Perak Malays in 1870s until the interference come from 
external parties, which had ulterior motives. Conflicts, stirred by the external 
elements, began to surface involving a few select individuals, particularly 
between Raja Abdullah and Ngah Ibrahim, as the former tried to seize tin-rich 
Larut from the latter. However, this conflict was more personal in nature and 
did not involve the majority of the Perak chiefs and the Malay population. 
There had been no threat to the citizens of Perak, no major bloodsheds and 
certainly no anarchy that would intimidate the political stability of the state. 
In sum, ‘Malay feudalism’, ‘civil war’ and ‘anarchy’ that frequently asserted 
to had happen in Perak in the 1870s are just a mythical narrative invented 
especially by the British colonial officials to justify their intervention. Some 
historians who overlooked some key historical accounts and sources had 
accepted this myth. 
Civil war can only be said to exist in Perak (or Larut) if it was viewed 
as armed conflicts between two opposing Chinese triads, the Ghee Hin and 
Hai San. This war had no connection whatsoever with the Malay conflicts and 
was in no way related to the power struggle between the Malay rulers. Instead, 
the whole saga was part of the quarrels that had been happening back in China 
mainland since before the turn of the 19th century. Major fights occurred 
near the tin mines, mainly in Larut, where the majority of the Chinese was 
populated.  
These fights did not spread throughout all parts of Perak. In fact, Hulu 
Perak, which was a Malay-dominated settlement, was rather in a state of peace 
and stability. Nevertheless, there existed certain quarters who tried to connect 
the Chinese fights with the Malay political impasse. The British officials, 
in their reports, for instance, were inclined to view these fights between the 
Chinese as a conflict that happened because of the Malay rulers fighting 
for power and soliciting external helps. They explained the wars among the 
Chinese triads as “...a symptomatic of anarchic state of affairs throughout the 
state of Perak” (Sullivan 1982:14).12
In this context, the British colonial officers tend to put the blame on 
Ngah Ibrahim as the one who gave rise to the crisis. He was labelled as an 
‘opportunist’, someone who would be willing to collaborate with any party that 
can help him remains in authority.13 From these officials’ views, his obsession 
with power created ‘anarchy’ in Larut and eventually turned things to be out of 
control. As Birch put it, ‘...the Mantri’s evil influence was the principal cause 
of all the trouble, and Chinese disturbances’ (Burns 1976:67). In truth, Ngah 
Ibrahim was a victim who had been caught in between of the two fighting 
Chinese groups. 
The disturbances caused by the Chinese triads apparently created 
more trouble to Ngah Ibrahim. Caught in the middle, Ngah Ibrahim was left 
to choose between the two fighting groups, and he sided with the one that he 
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thought can win the war. He believed that the war would not last long and that 
Larut would return to an eventual peace under his ruling. 
Since 1862, Ngah Ibrahim had been pledging his support to the Hai 
San, which was the earliest group of the Larut miners and had helped him with 
financial support. The group also had twice the number of Ghee Hin members, 
creating good odds in winning a war against the Ghee Hin. But he was wrong. 
In 1872, a shock Hai San defeat in the war against the Ghee Hin put Ngah 
Ibrahim in limbo. Worried that he might lose power and revenues, he switched 
his allegiance back and forth several times to the group that he felt was on 
the winning side. Wilkinson explained “It was a matter of indifference to him 
[Ngah Ibrahim] which side was the winner, so long as he continued to receive 
the revenues of Larut” (Wilkinson 1923:104).
The truth is that, if anyone were to be called opportunist—other than 
the British themselves—it should be the European-Chinese capitalists and 
the leaders of the Chinese triads. They took advantage of the Perak’s fiasco 
to manipulate it to their own gains through a number of ways. First, they 
interfered into the Malay politics by encouraging Raja Abdullah to submit 
claims that he was the legitimate Perak sultan. By lobbying Raja Abdullah, 
they expected him to pave way for them to grab the shares of the resources 
in return of their support. Second, they encouraged fights among the triads in 
Larut to the point that it was beyond containment. Weapons and immigrants 
were brought from China in a large scale, masked with ‘British citizenship’ 
to join the fights.14 Third, they manipulated their position and influence in the 
British administration since 1857 to urge a direct annexation by British on 
Perak and other Malay states, underlining political corruptions, wars, pirating 
and violence of the Malay rulers as their justifications and to protect their trade 
interest. They played an undeniably major role in laying the foundation that led 
to the eventual British intervention in the Malay states.  
British Intervention and the Pangkor Treaty 1874
Apart from the European-Chinese capitalists who manipulated the Perak 
situation to expand their capitalist activities, the British had also their own 
share of hands in annihilating the political stability in Perak. During the 
19th century imperialism, the British were the most influential side and 
were powerful enough to shape the political landscape of the Malay states. 
All parties acknowledged this colossal British power. They were made a 
reference by the Malay chiefs, the leaders of the Chinese Secret Societies and 
the European-Chinese capitalists to voice their grievances, solicit recognition 
or request for support when facing with certain conflicts. Those successful 
in getting the British sympathising with them would usually find themselves 
in an upper hand position. This was proven when the British supported and 
brought victories to Tengku Zhia’uddin (Kudin) in Selangor and Ngah Ibrahim 
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in Larut, Perak. 
Notwithstanding, the British policy in interfering into other Malay 
states’ affairs was motivated by their own interest and driven by the frequently 
inconsistent personal decisions made by the British officials. A Malay ruler 
could retain authority or be helped to grab power as long as the British could 
reap benefits from it. If a ruler were seen as a threat to their interest, the British 
would not hesitate to manoeuvre a move to oust this ruler and replace him with 
a pro-British ruler. This was what happened in Perak in the 1870s.
Under the Governor Ord, the policy of interference practiced by the 
British in Perak was mostly indirect, and occasionally, direct, with the British 
publicly pledging their backing to Ngah Ibrahim and acknowledging his ruling 
in Larut. In a letter dated 3-5 September 1873, Ord officially expressed his 
support to Ngah Ibrahim and indicated willingness even to offer military 
help to him and his ally group, Hai San.15 At one point, the British also made 
recognition to Raja Ismail as the legitimate Perak Sultan, though they quickly 
rescinded the acknowledgment when the claims by Raja Abdullah surfaced. 
Ord also had never recognized Raja Abdullah as the rightful sultan and had 
vehemently declined to fulfil the requests made by the Chinese merchants and 
the triads to intervene in Perak. In short, British support in Perak saw Ngah 
Ibrahim retaining power and halted Raja Abdullah’s effort to rise to power. 
However, the policies regulated by Ord made sudden turns when 
Clarke took over the Governor position in 1873. Clarke’s appointment began 
what was seen as an era where the British policies were shadowed by the 
influence or the ‘skilful pressure’ of a number of British officials-merchants 
in the Straits Settlements and the Colonial Office in London. These policies 
were incorporated with much interest put on the British companies that 
supported direct interference (MacIntyre 1961:47-69; MacIntyre 1967:199-
206). The urge for this intervention was made paramount through a petition 
by 248 Chinese traders in the Straits Settlements who were asking for British 
intervention due to the prevailing situation of Malay states of being ‘lawless’ 
and ‘in the state of anarchy’ (C.1111 Petition to Ord, 28 March 1873:30-32). 
An order was issued by the Secretary of the British Colony, Earl of 
Kimberley to Clarke on 20 September 1873, requesting the latter to make a 
serious evaluation on the situation, expedite the immediate course of actions 
to restore order and to consider an establishment of a British residential 
system in the Malay states.16 Kimberly’s written order, which amongst others, 
raised concerns on the interest of the investment of Read’s company, was not 
primarily aimed to protect the British investment which was allegedly under 
threat, but rather aimed to seek a platform for new investment opportunities for 
the European-Chinese capitalists.
Soon after the arrival of Clarke in Singapore in November 1873, 
Read and Tan, who had been anticipating the new Governor’s presence, made 
no delay to arrange a meeting with Clarke and hand over Raja Abdullah’s 
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claims. At the same time, the opposing Chinese triads were also requesting 
appointment of a British Resident who could mediate and resolve their disputes 
in Larut. All these demands were timely, as Clarke had been waiting for the 
right opportunity to orchestrate implementation of the British intervention 
policies in Perak. Moreover, Raja Abdullah had also promised to comply 
with the British demands, which included accepting a Resident in Perak and 
introduction of any new system deemed necessary. To Clarke, these promises 
are a gift handed on a silver platter, and for that, he made the vital decision to 
support Raja Abdullah’s claims.
At the onset of British intervention in Perak, Clarke persuaded the 
Malay rulers and the Orang Besar-Besar to attend a meeting in Pangkor in 
January 1874. Without providing the adequate opportunity for the chiefs to 
make due consideration and discuss among them for a decision, Clarke ‘forced’ 
these Perak chiefs members to sign the Pangkor Treaty in January 1874. This 
treaty had obviously been signed without the full consent of the majority of the 
Malay rulers, especially those in Hilir Perak, even though Clarke claimed the 
opposite.17There were a number of delegations who had been forced to attend 
and signed the treaty due to threats.18 Jervois explained the real situation of 
the Pangkor meeting, inside a British warship and escorted by the fully armed 
military personnel, as the following:  
In a British vessel, with a British man-of-war alongside, we collected 
together some Perak chiefs, to elect a sultan, when we just put down 
one who was absent and set up another who was present, that other 
being the wretched individual I have now described [Raja Abdullah] 
(quoted in Sadka 1970:11).
Perak Post-Pangkor Treaty
The Pangkor Treaty, signed on 20 January 1874, fashioned a dramatic effect in 
changing the political landscape in Perak. Through the treaty, Raja Abdullah 
was appointed as the new Perak Sultan. In return, under Clause 6, it was 
prescribed that a Resident, which would act as the sultan’s adviser, was to 
be appointed and his advice “...must be asked and acted upon all questions 
other than those touching Malay religion and custom” (Maxwell & Gibson 
1924:28-29). The British also sent a letter to Raja Ismail (who did not turn up 
in Pangkor) that informed him that he was to be stripped off the sultan title but 
allowed to continue using the Raja Muda title.19 Ngah Ibrahim was no longer 
recognized as the independent ruler of Larut, but rather to be treated as one 
of the many equally ranked Perak chiefs under the purview of the new sultan. 
After his appointment as the new sultan, Raja Abdullah did not wait 
too long to initiate the handover process of the concessions in Kerian-Larut to 
the Chinese capitalists in the Straits Settlements who had supported his quest 
for the state power all along. He drew up an agreement with Chee Ah Him, a 
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Chinese merchant and triad leader from Penang to develop a number of mining 
areas in Perak. Despite the earlier cautions by the British officials to obtain 
the Governor’s consent before making any major decision, Raja Abdullah 
conveniently neglected the advice and proceeded with his own plan. July 
1874, Raja Abdullah received an initial payment of $13,000 (from the agreed 
$26,000) from Lee Cheng Tee, who was Tan Kim Ching’s agent. This was the 
reward agreed for authorising Tan to collect revenues in Kuala Sungai Perak 
(Plunket 1876:Appendix III; Burns & Cowan 1975:xxviii). Raja Abdullah 
fulfilled all his commitments as promised. 
Although the treaty successfully mediated disputes between the 
Chinese, but failed miserably to reunite the Malays. In fact, the Malay politics 
was thrown into an even larger turmoil. Raja Ismail unanimously rejected 
the conditions of the treaty, which he felt made without full consent and 
consultation of Perak’s Orang Besar-Besar. The British policy that abruptly 
recognized Raja Abdullah as the new sultan angered the Malay Perak chiefs, 
especially in Hulu Perak and contributed to an alarming crisis. Suddenly, 
Perak had two sultans, each claiming to be the rightful ruler. One was selected 
and appointed by the Orang Besar-Besar Perak and another was through the 
Pangkor Treaty of 1874.     
In order to garner the Malays support, the British attempted their 
best to ensure that the official appointment of Raja Abdullah as the new sultan 
took place. Nevertheless, they were faced with tenacious resistance. Attempts 
to unveil Raja Abdullah officially as the new sultan were met with failures 
as Raja Ismail used all possible avenues to make known his reluctance in 
recognising the agreements penned in the Pangkor Treaty. He would also not 
easily relinquish his power and surrender all the Perak royal regalia, despite 
the umpteen efforts by the British officials asking him to do so. Many of the 
Perak Malay chiefs were also unwilling to cooperate with the British and 
acknowledge the treaty.20 Followers of Raja Ismail viewed Raja Abdullah’s 
recognition as illegitimate. Furthermore, majority of the Perak Malays still 
pledged their loyalty to Raja Ismail, who they considered their de facto ruler 
(C.1320 Birch to Braddell, April 1875:88). 
As long as the Perak royal regalia were not surrendered to Raja 
Abdullah, he could not be officially unveiled as the sultan, and Raja Ismail 
would maintain his status quo as the rightful state ruler (C.1512 Jervois to 
Carnovan, 10 February 1876:12). This means Raja Abdullah could not be fully 
utilised by the British to gain support from the Malay chiefs and the Perak 
Malays for its policy implementation. The British administrators, especially 
the British Resident J. W. W. Birch, was not entirely aware that the supreme 
state power did not merely lie with the incumbent sultan, but also through 
strong support of the Perak chiefs. Without their support, Raja Abdullah would 
not have enough authority to fulfil the British demands. 
Failure to understand the Malay customs and political tradition in Perak 
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explained why Birch blundered in his effort to mediate the Raja Ismail-Raja 
Abdullah conflict. Neither persuasion nor threats to Raja Ismail had worked 
to get the latter surrender the royal regalia and consequently acknowledge 
Raja Abdullah’s appointment. Birch’s economic policies, which had been 
exploitative, were also not favoured by the chiefs and the Malays, especially 
Raja Ismail’s followers in Hulu Perak. Those on Raja Ismail’s bloc also 
disputed Birch’s rights and power to implement changes in Perak under the 
name of Raja Abdullah as Raja Abdullah himself was not recognized as the 
legitimate ruler. Birch was subsequently reminded to respect the position of all 
Orang Besar-Besar in Perak. 
We inquire about our friend’s having got kuasa (written authority) over 
this country of Perak, to become Resident and govern Perak, collecting 
all the taxes of the country. From whom did our friend get that kuasa? 
Our friend must let us know clearly. If our friend got it from Rajah 
Abdullah, we will in no way accept a single clause of it, for Rajah 
Abdullah is not the only ‘Waris’ (blood royal) of the country of Perak; 
there are many other ‘Waris’ better than he... Moreover, we inform the 
gentlemen in Penang, Singapore, and other places that the kingdom for 
which they have made a Rajah is in the hands of us all, the ‘Waris’ of 
the country of Perak; and that, as regards Rajah Abdullah whom they 
installed, we will in no way, any of us, accept him, for it is against 
(or perhaps “he is outside the pale of”) Malay laws and customs. 
Moreover, the kuasa which you have received from Rajah Abdullah, 
we will none of us accept it. If you wish to use force to us, even then 
we will not accept it, but if it is only that you want the country of Perak, 
we will in no way resist you, for we none of us wish to fight with you, 
having no power to do so. Therefore you must show us plainly what is 
our fault towards you.21  
Birch’s ill-advised policies were not only met with lukewarm response 
from the Malay chiefs, many of whom in support of Raja Ismail, but also 
faced resistances from Raja Abdullah’s patrons. This development began to 
make Raja Abdullah reluctant in fulfilling every request made by Birch. Raja 
Abdullah was himself maybe not an anti-British, but signs were growing that 
many quarters were opposing the British policies in Perak. Birch’s attitude had 
also further antagonized the rakyat of Perak.  
Raja Abdullah was concerned that if he were to agree to hand over 
all the tax collection rights to the British as Birch had requested, the Malay 
chiefs of Perak, many of whom had been relying on the earnings from the tax 
they collected, would lose their main source of income. He would therefore be 
regarded as a traitor, including by his own supporters. Raja Abdullah was also 
hesitating to endorse Birch’s plans, as those would make him more unpopular 
among the Perak Malays, including people in Hilir Perak.22 The piling pressure 
and tensions that rose made him to begin realizing that he did not own absolute 
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authority in Perak, but rather was made part of a mechanism that would allow 
the British to exert control and power.  
Anguished with Birch’s continued pressure, in January 1875, Raja 
Abdullah acted to caution Raja Ismail not to sign the Pangkor Treaty nor 
surrender the Perak regalia to him. These actions, as according to Raja Abdullah, 
would only bestow Birch an even bigger room to exercise his authority. 
If Mr. Birch asks for the Regalia, or desires to make me King, do not 
my royal grandfather give up the Regalia, or consent to my being 
nominated King. And should my royal grandfather give his consent 
that I be made King, on that day, of a truth, the country of Perak will 
be given over to the English, for my words have caused me to be very 
much indebted to the English (Lunket 1876:7).  
Raja Abdullah’s failure to fulfil the British requests had inevitably 
angered Clarke. On 22 April, Clarke delivered a letter to Raja Abdullah, 
reminding that he was obligated to comply with all the clauses as stipulated 
in the Pangkor Treaty. Clarke also raised warning for all quarters not to carry 
out tax collections without getting an approval from the British Resident 
(Plunket 1876:Appendix No. XVII). Although Raja Abdullah attempted to 
explain to Clarke that Birch’s hurried measures were creating discontentment 
and pressure, he was severely castigated by Clarke (Plunket 1876:Appendix 
No. XVII). Raja Abdullah’s last efforts to send his representatives to discuss 
with Clarke came without much success. Clarke was in no appetite for a 
compromise. 
Things became worse after Clarke was replaced by a new Governor, 
William R. Jervois in May 1875. Jervois, who had an even more rigid stance, 
had taken actions without getting the necessary approvals from the British 
government.23 Soon after his appointment as the new British Governor, he 
immediately arranged a visit to Perak in September 1875 to meet Raja Ismail, 
Raja Abdullah and the Chiefs of Perak, pressuring them to accept the policies 
being carried out by the British Resident. Nevertheless, Jervois’ attempt 
failed as the Perak rulers would not budge from their position and defied his 
insistence. 
As a result, Jervois considered Raja Ismail and Raja Abdullah as an obstacle 
to the British progress in the state. He was in the opinion that British power 
could only be realised in Perak and other Malay states through annexation 
and forceful means (C.1512 Jervois to Carnovan, 10 February 1876, p. 23). 
In an effort to strengthen the British grip on Perak, Jervois instructed Birch to 
forcefully make Raja Abdullah relinquish his power to the British. In return, 
the British would pay him a living allowance of $2000 monthly. Again, this 
attempt was fruitless. Raja Abdullah rejected the idea. Not to be outdone, 
Jervois drafted three letters - two for Raja Abdullah, and another for Raja 
Yusuf- to be delivered through Birch to both of them The letters stated that if 
Raja Abdullah did not transfer his power to the British, Raja Yusuf then would 
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be appointed as the new sultan to replace him.24
The incessant pressure on Raja Abdullah began to crack him to a point 
that he was finally ready to sign the power transfer of tax collection declaration. 
Then, Birch continued to push with other declarations that include a surprise 
designation of British Resident as the state judge. This state judge position 
would be bestowed with absolute power on the laws and related matters, the 
appointment of administrators and chiefs, as well as the authority to collect 
all state taxes. Raja Abdullah considered this further demand unreasonable. 
He eventually signed the declarations, but through numerous excuses, did not 
accompany his signature with the official royal seal.25 Birch, enraged with Raja 
Abdullah’s actions, severely reprimanded the latter with all guns blazing in 
a meeting and reminded him about the letters that threatened to replace him 
with Raja Yusuf. Birch wanted him to know that he was at the mercy of the 
British and that they were serious. Soon after venting his anger, he chased Raja 
Abdullah away. Tension escalated when Birch violated the Pangkor Treaty by 
protecting indebted slaves, mainly women, who ran away from their masters 
and provided sanctuary for them in his residence in Bandar Baru (Plunket 
1876:14). 
This sparked an enormous outrage among the Malay rulers. Birch was 
now seen as not only disrespectful; he also created suspicion that grew by day 
on his real intentions and motives (Khoo Kay Kim 1965:33-47). The series 
of incidents, perceived as a reflection of Birch’s irrational actions, triggered 
anger and resentment among all quarters in Perak. Nevertheless, the Malay 
rulers were still willing to negotiate and undertake the diplomatic route to 
urge the British to be more considerate in bringing about changes in the state. 
Fully aware that their inferior military capability put them in no position to 
respond in a combative manner, the local rulers resisted the British passively 
by according cold treatment and simply being uncooperative. 
All these diplomatic and peaceful efforts failed to circumvent the 
British intention to continue interfering in the Perak state affairs. Persistent 
provocations by the British administrators such as Birch and Jervois 
compounded the predicament even further. Jervois, for instance, continued his 
insistence that the British should deploy a direct, military-backed occupation 
in Perak and was in favour to the use of force rather diplomacy (C.1512 Jervois 
to Carnovan, 10 February 1876: 12). The British arrogance inevitably began to 
push the local rulers to the edge. Tempers were boiling. With little option left, 
the Malay leaders decided to retaliate. This was culminated with two important 
events that followed: the assassination of Birch and the anti-British upheaval 
in 1875.
The revolt by the Malay chiefs in Perak was then fully utilised as 
an opportunity for the British to eliminate the resurging opponents, including 
supporters of Raja Ismail, Raja Abdullah, Ngah Ibrahim and other Malay 
chiefs. Raja Yusuf, a pro-British prince was later appointed as the Acting 
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Sultan. Birch’s assassination and the Malay uprising in 1875 were used as the 
perfect excuse for the British to exert, retain and expand its power throughout 
the state of Perak. It was also a prelude to a direct intervention and the eventual 
British colonization of the Malay states at the end of the 19th century. 
Conclusion
The discussion above has explained some major weaknesses discovered in 
the previous writings that discussed the political turbulence and crisis in the 
Malay states at the onset of British intervention in the 19th century. Generally, 
the past writings were inclined to view the conflicts in the Malay states as a 
manifestation of the so-called ‘Malay feudalism’ that is frequently referred to 
the disunity, power struggle and the decline of the Malay ruling system which 
had begun as early as during the Melaka Sultanate era. 
Despite acknowledging the existence of some degree of power struggle 
and political conflict in Perak’s history, this article accentuates the imperative 
need for historians to look at past conflicts beyond what had been previously 
communicated to facilitate profound understanding of historical events, and 
make analysis of all factors, internal and external. This present research also 
articulates that conflicts that occurred between the Malay rulers and chiefs had 
been personal in nature and were associated with small-magnitude opposing 
clusters. Moreover, these conflicts were never capable to trigger a large scale 
‘bloodshed’ or ‘civil war’ as was alleged, that would create a total chaos, result 
loss of people’s lives or threaten the downfall of the government of the day. 
Behind the negative perceptions that arise from the struggle for power among 
the Malay rulers, it was acknowledged that these events were to be a part of 
the ‘purification’ process of the Malay political tradition that consequently 
propagated a new, stronger and more stable political leadership than the 
previous era.
Nevertheless, this political ‘purification’ can never happen, if the 
state of concern is subject to external influences and elements that attempt to 
designs the political course, which subsequently agitates the balance of power 
and brings about crisis of higher magnitude. In the case of Malay political 
development in the 19th century, outside interventions and colonization 
by foreign power saw a creation of highly asymmetric power balance that 
continued to grow among the disputing Malay rulers. Previous conflicts 
had been resolved by assessing the support of the Malay chiefs and through 
diplomatic negotiations. However, as the third parties interfered, the situation 
was made more complex, with these third parties willing to lend support to 
those that could protect their own interest.  
This can be elucidated with the case happening in Perak in the 1870s. 
The conflict between Raja Abdullah and Raja Ismail was actually solved with 
Raja Abdullah backing down after the majority of the Malay chiefs expressed 
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their collective preference in Raja Ismail. Nevertheless, a renewed conflict was 
sparked off again later mainly due to the provocation by the triad leaders and 
the European-Chinese capitalists in the Straits Settlements. These unscrupulous 
leaders and capitalists knew, by pledging support to a side favourable to their 
ambitions and making instability, they would make maximum gains in the 
form of wealth and economic power in Perak. 
The political turbulence also became more complicated due to the 
British administrators’ own stand, which had been generally in cohort with the 
capitalists’ goals in the Settlements. They were more willing to accommodate 
these capitalists’ needs and desires for a full-scale British colonization of the 
Malay states. By showing their support to the local group that could fulfil their 
conditions, the British orchestrated a direct engagement to bestow power to 
their preferred choice and triggered a political disorder. This was later used as 
a convenient excuse for the British to begin their quest to colonize the Malay 
states at the end of the 19th century.   
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15.  C. 1111 Memorandum to the Lieutenant-Governor of Penang, 3 
September 1873; C. 1111 Letter to the Orang Kaya Muntri of Larut, 3 
September 1873, p. 160.
16.  C.1111 Kimberley to Andrew Clarke, 20 September 1873, pp. 38-
39. Disorder and demands from the Chinese merchants in the Straits 
Settlements were made as the main reason for the intervention. 
17.  Clarke frequently alleged that the chiefs had chosen Raja Abdullah as 
the legitimate Sultan of Perak and voluntarily agreed to all conditions 
during the meeting with British in Pangkor. However, this allegation 
was vastly doubted since soon after the Pangkor Treaty 1874 was made, 
the majority of the Malay chiefs convened a series of meetings and 
collectively agreed to oppose the conditions set up in the treaty. 
18.  According to Buyong Adil (1971:72), Ngah Ibrahim for example 
was forced and threatened with military actions to get him sign the 
Pangkor Treaty. Similar view was also put forth by Burns and Cowan 
who indicated that Clarke had used forces and threats to silent Ngah 
Ibrahim’s opposition in Pangkor and prevented him from influencing 
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other Malay chiefs. See Cowan (1961:185-86); Burns 1976:75). 
19.  Letter from the Governor to the Rajah Bandahara Ismail, 20 January 
1874 in Plunket, Enquiry as Complicity (1876), Appendix No. III.  
20.  In February 1874, a meeting to oppose the Pangkor Treaty convened. 
It was chaired by Dato’ Laksamana and attended by a number of other 
main Perak chiefs. In the meeting, the chiefs claimed they were unaware 
of the Clarke’s real intentions in getting them to sign the treaty. In 
addition, in March 1874, Menteri Ngah Ibrahim hired a Penang-based 
lawyer, R. C. Woods for $12,000 to initiate a legal suit of the opposition 
to the Pangkor Treaty to the British Parliament but was immediately 
vetoed by Raja Abdullah, worrying that his position as the new Sultan 
will be affected. See Wynne (1941:299).     
21.  The letter by the Perak Malay chiefs found in Haji Ali’s possession. See 
Plunket, Enquiry as Complicity, Appendix No. XXXIX.
22.  Jervois himself admitted that Raja Ismail’s position in Perak was 
strengthening after November 1874. Many of the Malay chiefs including 
Raja Yusuf and Raja Abdullah’s followers began to switch allegiances 
to Raja Ismail’s side. C. 1503 Jervois to Carnovan, 10 February 1876, p. 
10. 
23.  Jervois’s attitudes and policies was fiercely criticised by Carnovan. C. 
1512 Carnovan to Jervois, 20 May 1876, p. 75-85.
24.  Plunket, Enquiry as Complicity (1876:71). Threats in the letter handed 
to Raja Abdullah carried the following words; “Now we propose to our 
friend that officers of the British Government shall govern the country 
in the name of our friend. If our friend agrees to this, our friend will still 
be recognized as Sultan and receive a large allowance, but if our friend 
does not agree to this, we cannot help our friend, and our friend will be 
no longer Sultan.” 
25.  Raja Abdullah explained that the official Perak seal was damaged to free 
him from being bound by the declaration. See Plunket (1876:14). 
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